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Abstract 
This paper analyses the presence of political cycles in Portuguese governments’ 
expenditures using monthly data over the period 1991-2013 for the main categories of 
government expenditures. The results indicate that Portuguese governments act 
opportunistically regarding the budget surplus and that they favour capital instead of current 
spending near to the elections. Moreover, right-wing governments are more prone to 
reduce expenditures and deficits after the elections than left-wing ones. A deeper 
disaggregated analysis of the components of government expenditures corroborates these 
findings while disentangles other relevant patterns of political manipulation in Portugal. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the presence of political budget cycles in the Portuguese fiscal 
policy. Policy makers in democracies have clear incentives to use economic policies to their 
own advantage. Therefore, the influence of electoral concerns and government ideology on 
short-term economic performance has been an important topic in Public Choice. Empirics 
has consistently shown evidence of periodical shifts in economic aggregates associated with 
political motives, although mixed results are found regarding the partisan or opportunistic 
nature of these cycles. This article focuses on the particular case of government spending 
and budget, and on the individual case of Portugal. This type of investigation in a European 
Union country has an intriguing feature. We know that the Stability and Growth Pact 
constrains EU members’ fiscal policy, however not much else really remains to maneuver 
before elections and, in reality, some studies have found evidence that, although 
constrained, fiscal policy exhibits political motives. However, no such analysis has been done 
for the Portuguese case and with this article we intend to fill this gap in the literature.1 This 
study also constitutes an excellent testing ground to examine Brender and Drazen’s (2005) 
claim that political budget cycles are a phenomenon of new democracies. Furthermore, in 
recent years we have witnessed a renewed interest on the understanding of fiscal policy 
determinants and outcomes, more so in the case of a country like Portugal that since the 
turn of the decade is experiencing budgetary control difficulties. 
We use an extensive dataset to explore different levels and different aggregates 
related to fiscal policy. Contrary to the tradition of using quarterly or annual data, we make 
use of monthly data for the budget surplus, for current and capital expenditures and for 
their main components. The use of monthly data represents an important advantage in 
terms of level and detail of available information and in terms of the accuracy to control for 
                                               
1 Nevertheless, there are some studies at the local/municipal level in Portugal that are worth mentioning: Veiga 
and Pinho (2007) and Veiga and Veiga (2007a, b). 
 3 
the electoral and political effects. Moreover, the disaggregation of total expenditures allows 
us to check the existence of a competence signaling process similar to the one described by 
Rogoff (1990). In particular, going deeper in the composition of government expenditures 
for ten main areas of government spending allows us to explore different dimensions of the 
political budget cycle. 
The results provided by this study are quite interesting. They show an opportunistic 
behaviour by the Portuguese governments in what concerns to aggregated expenditures and 
the government budget surplus. They also show that right-wing governments are more 
concerned in reducing expenditures and the government deficit after the elections than left-
wing ones. There is also evidence of strategic manipulation of the composition of 
expenditures, as more is spent in election years on capital expenditures, probably on items 
that are highly visible to electorate. This later conclusion is supported by the more 
disaggregated analysis that follows, and other relevant patterns of political manipulations 
are also found in the component based empirical results. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature. 
Section 3 describes the data and the econometric model to be used in the empirical analysis. 
The empirical results are presented and discussed in section 4 and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Review of the literature 
The seminal work of Downs (1957) emphasizes the idea that economic strategies are 
not politically harmless nor political choices are free of economic concerns. To better 
understand this relationship numerous scholars have tried to comprehend how the 
ideological preferences of governments, the electoral agenda, and the competition between 
parties affect macroeconomic variables. Two main theories emerge from the literature: the 
political business cycle approach (Nordhaus, 1975) and the partisan theory (Hibbs, 1977). 
The first assumes that politicians have no policy preferences, so they act "opportunistically" 
selecting the policies that maximize their electoral support. They create unusual favorable 
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economic conditions before an election and - in order to correct this artificial unbalance–
contractionary measures are implemented immediately after the elections. Alternatively, 
the partisan theory does not view politicians as homogenous, arguing that different parties 
have different policy objectives, behaving, when in office, in a partisan manner.2 Specifically, 
left-wing parties are relatively more concerned with unemployment (growth) than with 
inflation, whereas right-wing parties are especially worried with inflation control (Hibbs, 
1977; Alesina, 1987; Alesina and Sachs, 1988). 
In the 1980's and 1990´s rational versions of both theories emerged, exploring the 
assumption that voters form expectations rationally. In a context where competence and 
asymmetric information are the key elements, both rational partisan models (Alesina, 1987; 
Alesina and Sachs, 1988) and rational opportunistic models (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 
1990) resulted in the reduction of policymaker's ability to induce political cycles. 
Empirical studies suggest that favorable economic conditions benefit governments 
(Hibbs, 2006). Partisan behavior seems to be more frequent in developed countries (Alesina 
and Roubini, 1992; Alesina et al., 1997), while opportunistic behavior appears to gather 
more support in developing countries (see, for instance, Brender and Drazen, 2009; Vergne, 
2009; and Shi and Svensson, 2006). 
Along with the other main economic aggregates, governments’ fiscal policy has also 
been studied to see if it is governed by political as much as economic considerations. The 
extension of the traditional approaches to fiscal policy is straightforward: boosts in 
expenditures and/or revenue reductions prior to elections should signal opportunistic 
behavior, while in the partisan perspective left-wing governments are more prone to budget 
deficits than their counterparts. The actual theoretical modeling of political budgetary cycles 
came with Rogoff and Sibert’s (1988) work that presented a model of adverse selection 
underlining competence and asymmetric information. A further refinement made by Rogoff 
                                               
2 The partisan model generates policy effects after elections, while the opportunist model generates policy 
effects before elections. 
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(1990) highlighted the need to search budgetary cycles inside the broad aggregates, 
especially in the composition of government spending.3 The model considers that the most 
efficient way for governments to signal competence is to divert spending from capital 
spending to current spending thus favoring transfers and more visible programs. The idea is 
to increase those expenditures that send the strongest signals, consequently trading those 
that generate benefits over time for those that are noticeable immediately. 
Several studies, both at national and multi-national level, have provided evidence of 
the relationship between elections and fiscal policy manipulations. Shi and Svensson (2002a, 
b; 2006), using multi-country data, consistently capture political budget cycles and show that 
the effect is significantly stronger in less developed countries. In their latter article they find 
that, on average, fiscal deficits increase by 22% in election years. For a set of developed 
countries, Persson and Tabellini (2003) find a political revenue cycle, but no trace of political 
cycle in expenditures, budget or transfers. Focusing on EU countries Andrikopoulos et al. 
(2004) do not find a fiscal electoral cycle, Mink and de Haan (2006) report a budget deficit 
increase in electoral years and a significant but small partisan effect on fiscal aggregates, 
while Efthyvoulou (2012) concludes that governments across the EU tend to generate 
budgetary opportunistic cycles and that these are much larger in the Eurozone countries. 
Highlighting institutional features, Persson and Tabellini (2002) show that the form of 
government (presidential or parliamentary) and the electoral rules (proportional or 
majoritarian) affect the configuration of budget cycles. 
Other studies explore the expenditure components. Alesina (1988), for example, 
reports a small electoral cycle in transfers in the United States. For Canada, the results found 
by Blais and Nadeau (1992) suggest a short pre-electoral cycle observable on road 
expenditures and social services, while Potrafke (2010), focusing on direct transfer 
payments, finds that incumbents increase the growth of public health expenditures in 
                                               
3For empirical evidence on election motivated expenditure shifts see, for instance, Katsimi and Sarantidis 
(2012). 
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election years. Analysing the allocation of public expenditures in OECD countries, Potrafke 
(2011a) also finds that left-wing governments tend to increase expenditures on Public 
Services and Education. 
For Portugal there is some relevant research done at the level of the local 
governments’ political budget cycle. For example, Veiga and Veiga (2007a) report an 
increase in local governments’ total expenditures before elections and a change in their 
composition that favors items immediately visible to the electorate, namely investment 
expenditures on overpasses, streets and complementary works, and on rural roads.4 Using 
annual data from 1990 to 2011 for the 10 components of public expenditures defined by the 
OECD in the so called COFOG (Classification of the Functions of Government), Castro and 
Martins (2016) find that in election years governments tend to increase spending in items 
such as general public services, social protection and health care and that the overall 
budgetary opportunistic effects are found to be significantly more important than partisan 
effects. In this paper we check the former result using the economic classification of 
expenditures and assess whether the behavior of local authorities reported by Veiga and 
Veiga (2007a) is also present at the national level of Portuguese governance. 
 
3. Data and econometric model 
The dataset used in this analysis to explore the presence of opportunism and partisan 
effects in the composition of Portuguese government expenditures comprises all the 
monthly data available for the ratio of current and capital government expenditures to the 
government total expenditures (CurrExpd and CapExpd),5 government budget surplus 
                                               
4
 Also at local level, Veiga and Pinho (2007) analyse the political determinants related to the allocation of 
intergovernmental grants and Veiga and Veiga (2007b) find that there is an electoral payoff to opportunistic 
investment expenditures. 
5 Note that total government expenditures is equal to current plus capital government expenditures, therefore, 
CapExpd=1-CurrExpd. The ratios are used in the empirical analysis because, contrary to their levels, they are 
stationary (see stationarity tests in Table A.4 in Annex). 
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(GovBS) and unemployment rate (UR) over the period 1991:1 to 2013:6, collected from the 
Bank of Portugal. 
In order to go deeper in the investigation of potential politically driven changes in the 
composition of Portuguese government expenditures, we also consider in this analysis seven 
of its components for the same time period. Following the economic classification these 
expenditures are: Personnel, Goods and Services, Interest, Subsidies, Current Transfers, 
Capital Goods and Capital Transfers (see Table A.2 in Annex for more details). Each 
component is then divided by the total expenditures – similarly to capital expenditures – and 
then estimated separately as a time series. 
Most studies use annual or quarterly data, however the use of monthly data not only 
increases the number of available observations but also has the important advantage of 
allowing a more accurate control of electoral timings. However, standard explanatory 
variables like the oppeness of the economy, corruption indexes and other annual based 
economic variables are simply too agreggate to be included in our model. Following Alesina 
et al. (1997), some political variables were added to this dataset to control for opportunistic 
and partisan effects at the two different dimensions/disaggregated levels considered in this 
study: variables that take value 1 in the previous # months to the elections, including the 
month of the elections(PreElect#); variables that take value 1 in the # months after the 
elections (PostElect#); a variable that takes value 1 when right-wing governments are in 
office and -1 in case of a left-wing government (TPart); variables that takes the value 1 in the 
# months after a right-wing party has taken office and -1 in the # months in case of a left-
wing party (RPart#); and some variables equal to previous (RPart#) but that only include 
those cases in which an election changes the ideology of the government from the left to 
right or from right to left (CRPart#). All Portuguese governments have been led by the Social 
Democratic Party (PSD) or by the Socialist Party (PS), the first being on the right side of the 
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political spectrum and the second on the left.6 A complete description of the variables is 
presented in Table A.1 of the Annex. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study 
are reported in Table A.3 of the Annex. 
We provide a time series analysis employing an OLS estimator over a dynamic 
specification to account for the autocorrelation in the error term. The dependent variables 
(CapExpd, GovBS, or each of the expenditures components) are assumed to be a function of 
all their significant lags, the change in unemployment rate,7 and a set of political variables 
(Opport and Partisan): 
t
i
tttt
J
j
jtjt MiPartisanOpportURCapExpdCapExpd   


11
11
 (1) 
where t=1991:1,…,2013:6 and Mi represent monthly dummy variables that are included in 
the model to control for seasonality; Opport includes the PreElect# and PostElect# variables 
whilst TPart, RPart# and CRPart# are the set of variables in Partisan. In a second group of 
regressions CapExpd is replaced by GovBS. Additionally in the expenditure component 
analyses, we replace CapExpd by each of the seven types of expenditures – one at a time. In 
both of these experiments, the set of regressors in the right side of the equation remains 
unchanged. The empirical results from all these experiments are presented and analysed in 
the next section. 
 
4. Empirical results 
In this section, we provide a set of empirical results on the presence of opportunistic 
and partisan effects in government expenditures and budget. We start by analysing the 
                                               
6
 We have 7 national elections in our sample period, which are the following (with the respective changes in 
the political orientation of the government): 06/10/1991 (no change: right government in office); 01/10/1995 
(change in government from right to left); 10/10/1999 (no change left government in office); 17/03/2002 
(change in government from left to right); 20/02/2005 (change in government from right to left); 27/09/2009 
(no change); 05/06/2011 (change in government from left to right). 
7 ADF and PP unit root tests reported in Table A.4 in Annex indicate that it is the first difference in the 
unemployment rate that is stationary. The other variables are not following a unit root process. 
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effects at the lowest degree of disaggregation, comparing effects related to capital and 
current expenditures. We then look for evidence of opportunistic and/or partisan behaviour 
regarding the government budget surplus. Finally, we go deeper inside expenditures and 
explore the presence of political effects at a more disaggregated level, considering seven 
components of current and capital expenditures, as given by the economic classification. 
 
4.1 Results for capital expenditures and government budget surplus 
We start by considering as dependent variable the ratio of government capital 
expenditures to the total expenditures (CapExpd). Four lags of this variable are needed to 
control for the autocorrelation in the error term. Lag two of the change in the 
unemployment rate was also considered given that it provided the highest level of 
significance for its estimated coefficient. As expected, when the unemployment rate rises, 
the ratio of capital expenditures decreases, a fact that can be justified by the consequent 
increase in the current expenditures to pay those additional unemployment subsidies. In the 
estimations explaining the governments’ capital expenditures percentages reported in Table 
1, a set of political variables is introduced. The first two regressions try to analyze the 
government’s opportunism regarding the timing of the elections. The first tries to capture 
the ex-ante effect and the second the ex-post effect that are predicted by the theory. 
Several periods were considered before and after the elections but the ones reported in the 
tables were those that produced the highest significant coefficients. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
On the one hand, we observe that before elections – in particular, half a year before 
elections – the ratio of government capital expenditures to the total expenditures tends to 
increase, a result in line with those found by Veiga and Veiga (2007a) for Portuguese local 
governments. This effect is compensated by a decrease in the ratio of current expenditures 
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to the total.8 On the other hand, during a period of six months after the elections, the ratio 
of government capital expenditures to the total decreases significantly.9 These results point 
to a complete opportunistic cycle that favours capital expenditures before elections and 
current expenditures after. Probably the preference for capital expenditures before 
elections is related to competence signalling. Increased spending on short term 
interventions in order to improve highly visible infrastructures like, for instance, roads, 
schools and hospitals; increased spending to speed up the conclusion of infrastructures 
being constructed to coincide with election dates, and other potential “ribbon cutting” 
capital expenditures may explain the pre electoral cycle found. In a sense, our results 
contradict Rogoff’s (1990) model that posits an increase in current expenditures rather than 
in capital expenditures near elections. However, the key note here is that governments 
should focus on visible expenditures as they send strong competence signals. So capital 
versus current spending in Rogoff’s model seems to be a bit different than the two typical 
types of expenditures found in accounting. As such, the conclusion drawn from our results is 
that probably the Portuguese governments give preference to visible capital expenditures 
rather than visible current expenditures when elections are approaching and the contraction 
that follows the elections corrects the unbalance by favouring current expenditures. 
Next, we test for the presence of partisan effects. We start by testing the traditional 
partisan theory using a dummy that takes value 1 for right-wing governments and -1 for left-
wing ones. No significant effects are found in this case. The same result is observed when we 
test for the rational partisan theory using the variable RPart#. Several periods after the 
                                               
8
 As mentioned above, CapExpd=1-CurrExpd by definition. This means that there is symmetry in the effects 
when the variable CurrExpd replaces CapExpd in the regressions. Hence, there is no need to replicate those 
results here, since the respective coefficients will be the same (as well as the respective standard errors) but 
with symmetric signs. 
9
 More specifically, half a year before elections this ratio increases by about 1.9 percentage points, while during 
the six month period after the elections it decreases by about 2.3 percentage points. For longer periods before 
the elections, no significant coefficients were found; after the elections, we were able to find some significant 
effects (but only marginally) until nine months after the elections have occurred. 
 11 
elections were considered, but none has produced significant coefficients. Hence, we report 
the results for the one that produced the lowest p-value (RPart6). However the degree of 
electoral surprise may be greater when the party elected represents an ideological shift in 
power. Alesina et. al. (1997) argue that the electoral outcome of re-election can be less 
surprising than an actual ideological change in government. Therefore, as a refinement of 
the Rpart# variable, we employ CRPart# that takes the value 1 (-1) in the # months starting 
with a change to a right-wing (left-wing) government. Results in regression 6 provide an 
interesting result: right-wing governments seem to be more prone to cut on capital 
expenditures after elections than left-wing parties. More specifically, while both types of 
governments tend to restrict capital expenditures until about six months after the elections 
as part of the opportunistic behaviour, right-wing governments tend to promote deeper and 
longer cuts in time; they are disposed to keep those cuts until about two years after the 
elections, exhibiting a partisan preference in accordance with theoretical expectations. This 
conclusion is also corroborated when all political variables are included in the model 
(regression 7) and even when the growth rate of government capital expenditures 
(homologous variation) is used instead of its ratio to the government total expenditures (see 
column 8). This last estimation shows that the results found using the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total expenditures still hold in the more traditional growth rate approach. 
Additionally, we also test for the presence of opportunism and ideological effects 
concerning the government budget surplus (GovBS). The respective results are shown in 
Table 2. Only lag 12 of the dependent variable is needed to control for the autocorrelation in 
the error term. Regarding the unemployment rate, its fifth lag is the one that provides the 
highest level of significance for its estimated coefficient. The results show that when the 
unemployment rate rises, the government surplus decreases. This can be due to the 
consequent increase in the current expenditures with unemployment subsidies and, at the 
same time, this may indicate a slowdown in the economic activity, and a consequent 
decrease in tax revenues. 
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[Insert Table 2 around here] 
In the following analysis, we pursue a similar pattern to the one considered in Table 
1. We start by controlling for the presence of political opportunism before elections 
considering the partisan effects. In columns 1 and 2, we observe that before elections – in 
particular, a quarter before elections – the government budget surplus decreases (or the 
deficit increases) on average by about 300 millions of euros; however, after the elections no 
significant effects are found even though the coefficient on PostElect12 is positive.10 This 
means that, in this case, the political opportunism is only significantly felt before the 
elections and that probably has its origin in the expenditures’ pre-electoral boost reported in 
Table 1. After elections the receipts might be counterbalancing the contraction of 
expenditures reported previously. 
Regarding the partisan or ideological effects, we find evidence of both traditional and 
rational partisan effects. However, the rational partisan effects have proved to be more 
relevant than the traditional ones (see regression 6). The change in government ideology 
with the elections is also important. Regression 5 shows that a new right-wing government 
will contribute to an increase of around 200 million Euros in the government budget surplus 
until about two years after the elections. Nevertheless, this effect remains valid during the 
first year after the elections and even if no ideological change occurs (see regressions 4 and 
6). 
When both the opportunistic and partisan effects are controlled for at the same time 
in the same regression (columns 7 and 8), we confirm the importance of both effects 
simultaneously and can conclude that Portuguese governments tend to act opportunistically 
before the elections, with right-wing governments being more concerned with budget 
control than the left-wing ones, especially after the elections. This result combines features 
of both partisan and opportunistic theory and it is in line with Frey and Schneider’s (1978) 
                                               
10 A period of 12 months after the election is chosen because it is the one that presents the lowest p-value for 
the respective estimated coefficient. 
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argument that before elections governments’ tend to act opportunistically to gather public 
support and afterwards follow ideological preferences. 
In sum, this analysis shows that Portuguese governments act opportunistically 
regarding expenditures and the respective budget surplus. Moreover, our results also show 
that right-wing governments tend to be more concerned in reducing expenditures and the 
government deficit after the elections. However, two important questions remain to be 
answered: Which components of the expenditures play the main role in that opportunistic 
behaviour? Furthermore, do right or left-wing governments have a similar behaviour 
regarding the composition of those expenditures? These are two important issues that we 
try to answer in the next step of this study. 
 
4.2 Results for the composition of government expenditures 
A similar analysis is now provided for each of the seven components of government 
expenditures as defined by the economic classification: Personnel, Goods and Services 
(CurrGoods), Interest, Subsidies, Current Transfers (CurrTransf), Capital Goods (CapGoods) 
and Capital Transfers (CapTransf). Each of these dependent variables is also used in the 
empirical estimations as its ratio to the total expenditures. A summary of the results is 
presented in Table 3. 11 It is commonly argued that right-wing parties tend to reduce public 
expenditures and promote policies that deregulate the public sector while left-wing parties 
favour more state intervention and are more vigorous in implementing policies that 
redistribute income and improve the overall social conditions12. As such, general 
expectations are that left-wing governments should exhibit higher levels of overall public 
spending than their counterparts. Specifically, expenditures with Personnel and Current 
Transfers may be those categories more likely to reflect this pattern. As to the other 
                                               
11
 Here we only present a summary of the most pertinent results due to space limitations, but the complete set 
of results for the estimation of each individual regression – with the respective expenditure component as 
dependent variable – is available upon request. 
12 On this matter see, for instance, Potrafke (2011b) and Herwartz and Theilen (2017). 
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components we have no prior expectations as there is some mixed signalling associated with 
them. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
In Table 3, only the results for the coefficients on the political variables are reported, 
meaning that each coefficient relates to a single regression that was estimated including the 
necessary lags of the dependent variable to eliminate any error autocorrelation, the 
required (lagged) change in the unemployment rate, and monthly dummies to control for 
seasonality. At the bottom of the table the number of months used for each political variable 
is also reported. Several periods were considered before and after the elections but the ones 
reported in the tables were those that produced the lowest p-values for the respective 
estimated coefficient. 
It seems that there is no political tempering with public wages and current transfers 
that include assistance to the unemployed, fire fighters and other non-reimbursable 
monetary flows that help institutions face their current expenditures. At some degree these 
are unexpected results as a common sense approach would find their tempering plausible 
and electorally effective. Maybe the permanent nature of increases in wages and transfers is 
refraining governments from using them electorally. Manipulating these categories would 
increase public spending not just in the electoral year but in the years to follow and, in terms 
of popularity, it would simply be too costly to reduce wages and transfers after elections to 
correct the pre-electoral boosts.13 
                                               
13 Nevertheless, one event stands out from the recent Portuguese political history and it exemplifies a clear 
political manipulation in one of these budget categories. In 2009 – year of legislative elections in Portugal and 
while the international economic crisis was spreading across the western world – Socialist Prime Minister José 
Socrates announced a 2.9% increase in the wages of the civil servants. This was the largest wage increase since 
the start of this century and the first in three years. This political decision was viewed as an evident attempt to 
improve the popularity of the government at the time. Although we do not find evidence that this 
opportunistic behaviour is systematic across our sample, this is an example of simultaneous opportunistic and 
partisan behaviour, since expenditures with personnel are expected to increase more with left-wing 
governments. 
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As expected, the results at this more disaggregated level of public expenditures also 
show evidence of opportunistic and partisan behaviour. Regarding the first group of effects, 
we observe that the ratio of expenditures on capital goods to total expenditures increases 
before elections. This is in line with our findings at a more aggregated level and reinforces 
Rogoff‘s (1990) argument that public spending should be diverted to items more visible to 
voters before elections. We also found evidence of a post electoral cycle related to capital 
transfers as these expenditures tend to decrease after the elections. These results help 
clarify the capital components in which political cycles play a major role. 
When we take a closer look to the disaggregated governments’ current expenditures 
traditional partisan effects clearly dominate. The ratios of current goods and services, 
subsidies, and interests all seem to be higher when right-wing parties are in office as 
opposed to left ruling. We had no prior theoretical expectations regarding partisan effects 
on these particular components, however as it seems that right-wing parties favour them, 
probably the expenditures that are being increased in these components are those with the 
military, price grants and other expenditures theoretically more attached to the right. 
Regarding the interest component, in general governments pay current interests from loans 
negotiated in the past. As we find evidence that this partisan effect appears to be stronger in 
the first half of the term it seems that right-wing governments could be paying, at least in 
part, the above average indebtment of previous governments, in particular left-wing ones. In 
this sense our results are in accordance with theoretical expectations that left-wing parties 
are more prone to deficits than their counterparts. 
When looking at capital transfers both opportunistic and partisan effects seem to be 
at play, revealing some puzzling results. The effects found seem to indicate a post electoral 
reduction on this component in the six months following an election, and that this reduction 
is reinforced and holds for the first half of a term when a change in the political orientation 
of the government occurs with the election of a “new” right-wing government. This “new” 
right-wing government (PSD) tends to be more concerned in reducing capital transfers until 
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two years after the elections than a “new” left-wing government (PS). So, the post electoral 
reductions in capital expenditures observed in table 1 (see column 6), are essentially due to 
movements in capital transfers. 
As a robustness check to the overall results found in table 3, we also estimated each 
expenditure component considering the simultaneous inclusion of all political variables and, 
in addition, regressed each component with only those political variables that proved to be 
statistically significant in the “all variables in” regressions. In general, the results corroborate 
the opportunistic and partisan effects found above.14 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyse whether public expenditures in Portugal are politically 
driven near elections and whether right-wing governments tend to be more constrained 
when it comes to spending than left-wing governments. 
The empirical analyses employed in this paper to examine these questions revealed 
the existence of both opportunistic and partisan effects, although electoral ones were found 
to be relatively more significant and robust. In general, the way Portuguese governments are 
found to “play” with aggregated expenditures and the respective components is consistent 
with previous studies and theoretical expectations. Results point out to the presence of a full 
opportunistic cycle in capital expenditures as described by Nordhaus (1975). Both pre-
electoral expansions and post-electoral contractions are found, however this last effect 
disappears when we examine the budget deficit. Furthermore, right-wing governments tend 
to be more concerned in reducing expenditures and the government deficit after the 
                                               
14
 Those results are not presented here due to space limitations, but they are available from the authors upon 
request. In particular, in those regressions in which Rpart# and CRPart# were found to be jointly significant 
(Personnel and Current Transfers), we tested the null that the sum of their coefficients was zero. Test results 
did not reject the null, so we conclude that there are no rational partisan effects found in the referred 
components. Moreover, we also checked some interaction effects upon public expenses depending on the 
level of either unemployment or inflation while a rightist or a leftist party is in office, but no relevant 
interaction effects were found. 
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elections than left-wing ones. It seems that Portuguese governments act opportunistically 
when they really need to and behave in a partisan manner when they can. 
When taking a closer look at expenditures, detailing and analysing their components, 
we found that the contraction of capital expenditures after elections is due to a reduction in 
the capital transfers and not related to variations on the Gross Fixed Capital Formation. 
Furthermore, we observe that the ratio of expenditures on capital goods to total 
expenditures increases before elections, confirming the already found opportunistic 
behaviour on aggregate capital expenditures, and reinforcing the idea that public spending is 
systematically being diverted to items more visible to voters before elections. 
Finally, the results indicate the presence of partisan effects in some current 
expenditures components. For instance, right-wing governments appear to pay more 
interests on debt than left-wing ones. Hence, our results seem to suggest that right-wing 
governments could be paying, at least in part, the above average indebtment of left-wing 
governments. 
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List of Tables 
Table 1. Empirical results for the government capital expenditures 
 Opportunism Partisan All Growth 
  Traditional Rational   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
CapExpd(-1) 0.153** 0.151** 0.161*** 0.157** 0.149** 0.139** 0.116* -0.146** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) 
CapExpd(-2) 0.074 0.072 0.081 0.080 0.073 0.064 0.051 -0.076 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.060) 
CapExpd(-3) 0.109* 0.106* 0.106* 0.105* 0.102 0.101 0.093 0.094 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.62) (0.062) (0.060) 
CapExpd(-4) 0.194*** 0.198*** 0.189*** 0.191*** 0.181*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.229*** 
 (0.61) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) 
UR(-2) -0.093*** -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.095*** -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.091*** -1.309** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.509) 
PreElect7 0.019*      0.016  
 (0.011)      (0.011)  
PostElect6  -0.023**    -0.023** -0.020* -0.432** 
  (0.011)    (0.011) (0.011) (0.202) 
TPart   0.001    0.007  
   (0.004)    (0.005)  
RPart6    0.009   0.014  
    (0.010)   (0.011)  
CRPart24     -0.012* -0.012* -0.023** -0.239** 
     (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.121) 
         
         
No. Obs. 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 255 
R2 0.392 0.394 0.384 0.386 0.391 0.401 0.415 0.163 
B-G test 0.941 0.853 0.923 0.882 0.907 0.695 0.776 0.497 
SBIC -616.0 -617.0 -612.8 -613.5 -615.6 -614.6 -604.6 861.2 
Notes: Standard-errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; 
**, 5%; and *, 10%.  is the first difference operator. All regressions include monthly dummies to control for 
seasonality. Four lags of the dependent variable are needed to control for autocorrelation; the p-value for the 
Breusch-Godfrey test to autocorrelation of order 1 is reported in the bottom of the table, as well as the 
Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC). The last column presents results for the growth rate of capital 
expenditures. 
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Table 2. Empirical results for the government budget surplus 
 Opportunism Partisan Both 
  Traditional Rational  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
GovBS(-12) 0.310*** 0.309*** 0.290*** 0.303*** 0.314*** 0.295*** 0.303*** 0.307*** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) 
UR(-5) -0.838*** -0.891*** -1.077*** -0.981*** -1.007*** -1.062*** -1.026*** -0.948*** 
 (0.267) (0.269) (0.278) (0.267) (0.273) (0.277) (0.283) (0.266) 
PreElect3 -0.297*      -0.269* -0.303** 
 (0.157)      (0.159) (0.155) 
PostElect12  0.064     0.056  
  (0.086)     (0.086)  
TPart   0.102**   0.054 0.049  
   (0.042)   (0.050) (0.055)  
RPart12    0.192***  0.141* 0.163* 0.193*** 
    (0.069)  (0.083) (0.088) (0.069) 
CRPart24     0.204**  0.019  
     (0.094)  (0.086)  
         
         
No. Obs. 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 
R2 0.462 0.455 0.467 0.471 0.465 0.473 0.482 0.479 
B-G test 0.586 0.716 0.448 0.344 0.487 0.316 0.231 0.254 
SBIC 564.8 568.0 562.4 560.7 563.6 565.0 577.4 562.2 
Notes: Standard-errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; 
**, 5%; and *, 10%.  is the first difference operator. All regressions include monthly dummies do control for 
seasonality. Only the lag 12 of the dependent variable is needed to control for autocorrelation; the p-value for 
the Breusch-Godfrey test to autocorrelation of order 1 is reported in the bottom of the table, as well as the 
Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC). 
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Table 3.Results by component of government expenditures – one variable at a time 
 Personnel CurrGoods Interest Subsidies CurrTransf CapGoods CapTransf 
        
PreElect# 0.010 -0.001 -0.013 -0.003 -0.004 0.004* 0.018 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.012) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.011) 
PostElect# 0.010 0.041** 0.021 0.001 -0.011 -0.002 -0.020* 
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.015) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.011) 
TPart 0.001 0.002** 0.163*** 0.002** -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
RPart# -0.012 0.001 0.012* 0.003 -0.008 0.001 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.015) 
CRPart# 0.007 (0.002) -0.023 0.003 0.027 -0.0016 -0.013* 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.024) 0.003 (0.017) (0.0013) (0.007) 
        
        
No. Obs. 265 265 267 265 265 265 267 
Months PreElect9 PreElect12 PreElect8 PreElect6 PreElect11 PreElect8 PreElect6 
 PosElect3 PosElect3 PosElect5 PosElect12 PosElect3 PosElect11 PosElect6 
 RPart3 RPart9 RPart24 RPart6 RPart6 RPart12 RPart3 
 CRPart9 CRPart9 CRPart3 CRPart6 CRPart3 CRPart24 CRPart24 
Notes: Only the results for the political variables are reported here, but the estimated specification also includes 
the necessary lags of the dependent variable, to eliminate any error autocorrelation, the (lagged) change in the 
unemployment rate, which has almost always a significant coefficient, and monthly dummies to control for 
seasonality. Each variable was included at a time in the respective estimated specification. Standard-errors are 
reported in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
The number of months used for each political variable is reported at the bottom of the table. Those are the 
ones that presented the lowest p-value for the respective estimated coefficients. 
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Annex 
 
 
Table A.1 – Definition of the variables 
Time series  
CapExpd Ratio of the government capital expenditures to the government total expenditures. 
GovBS Government budget surplus (in billions of Euros). 
UR Unemployment rate. 
PreElect# Variable that takes the value of 1 in the month of the elections and in the previous # months to the 
elections; election dates: 10/1991; 10/1995; 10/1999; 03/2002; 02/2005; 09/2009; 06/2011. 
PostElect# Variable that takes value 1 in the # months after the elections. 
TPart Traditional partisan variable that takes the value of 1 when a right-wing government is in office and -1 in 
case of a left-wing government. 
RPart# Rational partisan variable that takes the value of 1 in the # months after a right-wing party has taken office 
and -1 in the # months in case of a left-wing party. 
CRPart# Variable equal to RPart# but that only includes those cases in which an election changes the ideology of the 
government (left to right or right to left). 
Sources: Online Statistics, Bank of Portugal (BPstat). 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2 – The components of the government total expenditures (Economic classification) 
GOVERNMENT CURRENT EXPENDITURES  
Personnel (Personnel) 
Wages and other gratifications to public servants and to individuals that are hired by the state 
Goods and Services (CurrGoods) 
Other current expenditures non related to wages like, for instance: constructions and military works that 
are not in nature capital expenditures; spending with military material, desk material, food, uniforms; 
conservation, communications, transportation. 
Interest and other charges (Interest) 
Expenditures related to current public debt charges. 
Subsidies (Subsidies) 
Financial flows without reimbursement from the state to public companies. It includes also expenditures 
with price grants and subsidies to the production of goods considered essential. 
Current Transfers (CurrTransf) 
Non reimbursable monetary flows that have the objective of helping institutions or entities face their 
current expenditures. Examples: Assistance to the unemployed, fire fighters, and community based 
institutions like sporting clubs and non-profitable organizations. 
GOVERNMENT CAPITAL EXPENDITURES 
Capital Goods (CapGoods) 
Gross fixed capital formation. 
Capital Transfers (CapTransf) 
Non reimbursable Public spending to fund capital expenditures of another entity. Examples: 
compensations for damages in buildings or crops; amortization of loans. 
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Table A.3 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Time Series      
CapExpd 271 0.111 0.081 0.014 0.482 
GovBS 271 -0.560 0.823 -4.034 2.721 
UR 271 7.840 3.313 3.900 17.80 
Elect 272 0.026 0.159 0.000 1.000 
TPart 272 -0.118 0.995 -1.000 1.000 
      
Expenditures Components      
Personnel 271 0.285 0.074 0.013 0.531 
CurrGoods 271 0.033 0.018 0.007 0.131 
Interest 271 0.130 0.098 -0.049 0.471 
Subsidies 271 0.017 0.017 0.000 0.120 
CurrTransf 271 0.415 0.115 0.183 0.700 
CapGoods 271 0.018 0.021 0.000 0.214 
CapTransf 271 0.093 0.073 0.012 0.467 
      
Sources: See Tables A.1 and A.2. The components of public expenditures are all in the ratio to total 
expenditures. 
 
 
 
 
Table A.4 – Unit root tests 
 Time Series    
 CapExpd GovBS UR UR    
ADF -8.845 -13.13 1.306 -7.009    
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.997] [0.000]    
PP -13.63 -18.84 3.702 -7.744    
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.999] [0.000]    
        
 Expenditures components    
 Personnel CurrGoods Interest Subsidies CurrTransf CapGoods CapTransf 
ADF -8.176 -12.84 -9.465 -11.66 -4.563 -12.54 -8.846 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
PP -15.33 -18.57 -11.74 -17.03 -6.351 -17.24 -13.29 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
        
Notes: For sources, see Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3.  is the first difference operator. For each test, we report the 
respective statistic and p-value (in square brackets). The ADF and PP tests are, respectively, the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron test that a variable follows a unit-root process, with constant and one 
lag of the difference of the respective variable. 
 
 
 
 
